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French but also European economies are driven by micro, small and medium enterprises. 
However, evidence shows that micro-enterprises, representing 99 per cent of all newly created 
businesses, suffer from a lack of external resources, especially those created by socially excluded 
persons. Traditional commercial banks are indeed often reluctant to satisfy the demand for credit 
by poor people who cannot guarantee financial collateral and stable revenues. Microfinance 
institutions (MFIs), dedicated to persons partially or totally excluded from the banking sector, 
have therefore developed special lending scheme such as progressive lending or group lending 
and hence demonstrated that poor people could surprisingly be creditworthy. Although many 
studies do exist on developing countries’ MFIs, few have been done to evaluate the social 
performance of microfinance programmes in industrialized countries. Considering this, we have 
developed in this paper an in-depth analysis of French institutions of microfinance and an 
econometric analysis on the personal and social characteristics of their clients, as a measure of 
MFIs social performance. We demonstrate that two types of microfinance client may be 
identified: the first type, mainly unemployed, uses microcredit as additional financing resources 
to complete a relatively important business plan, whereas the second type, mainly monthly 
guaranteed benefit income recipients totally excluded from the banking system, more vulnerable, 
uses microcredit as the only external financial resource available to start up a professional 
activity.. One of our key results is that being either poor, socially excluded or deprived from 
banking resources is not a sine qua non condition for accessing microfinance services. We also 
underline that the probability of default is much higher in the first group of borrowers and is 
positively correlated with loan size but negatively correlated with the level of the lending interest 
rate. 
 
Code JEL: G21 
Keywords: Microfinance, banking, poverty, self-employment.  
 
  
I. Introduction 
 
The emergence of microfinance and its very important progression were naturally monitored 
by major institutional recognitions. 2005 was indeed declared year of microfinance by the United 
Nations, whilst the 2006 Nobel peace prize was awarded to Mohammad Yunus, founder of the 
Grameen Bank and pioneer of microfinance.  
Microfinance is traditionally defined as a micro-sized finance which primarily includes 
microcredit, micro-insurance and micro-savings. Microcredits, which is the main activity of 
Microfinance institutions (MFIs), are commonly defined as productive loans granted to people 
excluded from the banking sector and whose amount is less than 40% of GNP per capita (Nowak 
[2005]). Although these services are developed by a wide range of institutions, from commercial 
banks to non-profit organizations, they are theoretically bound by three fundamental goals: reducing 
poverty, promoting self-employment and enhancing the empowerment of socially excluded 
populations, especially women. 
Since the entitlement approach1 developed by Amartya Sen, it has been well known that any 
lack of capabilities feeds poverty and social exclusion. Hence, a comprehensive survey led by Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Soledad Martinez Peria [2006] has shown that various barriers to banking sector 
measured in terms of physical access, affordability and eligibility of deposit, credit and payment 
services still exist and could potentially exclude a significant share of the population from using 
banking services. Economic development and growth may consequently be impacted. Considering the 
French experience, Gloukoviezoff [2004] has particularly emphasized the fact that social income 
earners are victims of discrimination from the banking sector: 48 per cent do not have a chequebook 
whilst 96 per cent do not benefit from a credit card. Providing financial services to poor people and/or 
socially excluded persons with no collateral to offer as a guarantee is usually perceived by as 
expensive, especially regarding the size of the transactions involved, the monitoring cost and the high 
default risk such categories of persons entail. Consequently, banks aren’t prone to deliver such 
services. MFIs are.  
The success of microfinance is often explained by the specific nature of microcredit or 
microsaving schemes. Considering the Sen’s approach of poverty, microfinance’s so-called revolution 
partly lies in the fact that default risk faced by institutions lending to socially excluded persons should 
not be any longer considered as too high if appropriate tools such as group lending or progressive 
lending are developed. Indeed, microfinance benefits should not be apprehended from a sole financial 
point of view. Non-credit features of microfinance programmes do matter. As stated in Mc Kernan 
[2002], “the large noncredit effects of the programmes provide evidence that group lending 
                                                 
1
 As stated by Devereux [2001], Sen has defined entitlements as “the set of alternative commodity bundles that a person can 
command in a society using the totality of rights and opportunities that he or she faces”.  
 programmes do more than just overcome credit market imperfections to increase access to credit for 
the poor. The group cohesion, joint liability, incentives to share information, and social development 
programmes that serve to differentiate group-lending programmes from banks or individual-lending 
institutions are an important part of microcredit programmes’ success.” 
The stakes of microfinance should however not be misunderstood. Designed to fight banking 
exclusion, it finds its social justification by offering financial services to people who were initially 
deprived of it. It should nevertheless be kept in mind that most MFIs strive for a functional, financial 
but also institutional viability (Nowak [2005]): microcredits are not donations and should be refunded. 
They also support an interest rate partly representative of the cost of the borrower. As mentioned by 
Littlefield and Rosenberg [2004], “Most of the early pioneer organizations in the modern microfinance 
movement operated as non-profit, socially motivated non governmental organizations. They 
developed new credit techniques: instead of requiring collateral, they reduced risk through group 
guarantees, appraisal of household cash flow, and small initial loans to test clients. Experience since 
then has shown that the poor repay uncollateralized loans reliably and are willing to pay the full cost 
of providing them: access is more important to them than cost.” 
The overwhelming success of MFIs should not be misleading and must not prevent from 
carrying out an in-depth analysis to determine if microfinance either is a useful poverty alleviation tool 
in the case of developing countries or fosters self-employement and financial inclusion in 
industrialized countries. Addressing this second issue in the French case, this paper is organized as 
follows: section 1 briefly surveys the literature on microfinance social performance. Section 2 
describes the features of microfinance programmes in industrialized countries and present French 
microfinance environment. In a final section, we develop a statistical and econometric analysis of 
French microfinance clients based on a unique database of 3,204 microcredit loans granted between 
2000 and 2006 in Aquitaine (the 6th largest French region with 3 million inhabitants). This allows us 
to address four fundamental questions: who are the clients of French microfinance? What are the 
financial characteristics of microcredits? What are the social and entrepreneurial needs this 
microfinance effectively fulfill and, conversely, how are microcredits reimbursed, considering each 
type of clients?  
 
II. Microfinance and social performance measurement 
 
Extensive literature already exists on microfinance in developing countries. Several aspects of 
microfinance have been evaluated is these countries, mostly dedicated to the evaluation of 
microfinance performance and outreach. More precisely, two major fields of research could be 
identified. First of all, much has been done to evaluate and/or to improve MFIs’financial performance 
and cost efficiency (Baumann [2004], Montgomery and Weiss [2005]). Many ways have been 
 explored: the incidence of gender in microfinance performance (Cloud and Panjaitan-Drioadisuryo 
[1999]), the role of asymmetric information in microfinance banking activities or the benefits of 
specific lending scheme such as group lending or progressive lending as enforcement mechanism 
(Egly [2004], Godquin [2004], Tedeschi [2006]). The importance of an appropriate regulatory 
framework to support sustainable microfinance programmes’ services have also been evaluated (Arun 
[2005]).  
A second major axis of research on microfinance has been dedicated to the measurement of 
microfinance impact and outreach either in terms of empowerment (Johnson [2005]) or social 
performance. The Social Performance Task Force from the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 
(CGAP) defines social performance as “the effective translation of an institution's social goals into 
practice in line with accepted social values; these include sustainably serving increasing numbers of 
poor and excluded people, improving the quality and relevance of financial services, improving the 
economic and social conditions of clients, and ensuring social responsibility to clients, employees and 
the community they serve”2. As stated in Copestake [2007], three sets of indicators are traditionnaly 
used to measure IMF social performance: the breadth of outreach (number of people using 
microfinance services during a given period), depth of outreach (initial social status of IMF clients) 
and quality of outreach (net benefit to each client). Thus, evaluating social performance imposes to 
analyse the entire process of microlending and not only its final impacts on beneficiaries. The key 
issue remains however to determine whether microfinance programmes effectively reach the poors 
and positively affect their welfare. Considering the developing countries’ experiences of microfinance, 
Haley and Morduch [2003] have shown that there is a wide diversity in MFIs respective capacity to 
reach poor people, some being able to target real poors, others “only” financing low income 
households. Nevertheless a large consensus seems to emerge to highlight that these programmes do 
not target the poorest of the poors but rather those who are near the poverty line. Gonzalez-Vega and 
alii [2000], studying this issue from an empirical point view in Bolivia, found that the five MFIs 
considered in the survey3 indeed reached poors who stay just above and just below this line. Similarly, 
Amin, Rai and Topa [2003] have used panel data from two Bangladeshi villages to test if 
microcredit reaches the poor and vulnerable and have demonstrated that although microfinance is 
successful at reaching the poor, it could paradoxical exclude those most in need of assistance, the 
vulnerable poor. Consequently, they underlined the fact that subsidized credits may have limits as an 
antipoverty strategy. Finally, Coleman [2006] has evaluated the outreach and impact of two 
microfinance programmes in two villages located in the north-east of Thailand. His results not only 
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 See the website : http://microfinancegateway.org 
3
 Based on a sample of 588 microfinance clients (from five MFIs : BancoSol, Caja Los Andes, FIE, Sartawi and PRODEM), 
this study more precisely compares the level of poverty of a treatment group reached by microfinance programs with the 
poverty of a control group within the population of La Paz 
 
 indicate that the wealthier villagers are significantly more likely to participate than the poors, they also 
highlight the fact that the richest village bank members use their position to borrow significantly more 
from the village bank. It is also shown that households holding land are more likely to be selected 
among village bank members. 
 
III. An identification of French MFIs 
 
Microfinance ambitions in industrialized countries slightly differ from the well-known 
objectives of developing countries’ traditional ones. If microfinance tends, in the developing countries, 
to reduce poverty and to support the empowerment of socially excluded persons, microfinance’s stake 
in industrialized countries is to improve access to external resources for micro-enterprises created by 
people deprived from banking resources. Micro-enterprises, which employ fewer than 10 people and 
whose annual turnover and/or balance sheet is 2.5 million dollars or less, account for 99% of newly 
created businesses but paradoxically suffer from a lack of banking resources. Usually offering no 
material or financial guarantees, socially excluded persons are those who are the most penalized. As 
mentioned in the European commission report on microfinance [2003], three obstacles explain more 
precisely this banking and financial exclusion: (i) high or operational costs for credit institutions, (ii) 
lack of sufficient collateral from micro-enterprises, (iii) perception of a too risky lending activity. As 
stated by the French Agency for development (2005), microfinance does not aim to satisfy the poors’ 
needs, but to give them access to a productive credit and, if necessary, to help them to get further 
access to the banking sector. Supporting self-employment and micro-enterpreneurship fosters social 
inclusion. Hence, as mentioned by Boyé, Hajdenberg and Poursat [2006], four fundamental objectives 
sought by microfinance programmes should now be considered for either industrialized or developing 
countries:  
 
(i) to reduce poverty;  
(ii) to encourage small businesses creation and self-employment;  
(iii) to support the growth and diversification of newly created 
microenterprises  
(iv) to reinforce the social position of women or underprivileged 
groups of population.  
 
Three arguments could be brought to the fore to explain the fact that fighting poverty is not 
the primary goal of industrialized countries’ microfinance programmes: (i) poverty appears to be a 
much more complex phenomenon in these countries and is therefore particularly complicated to 
alleviate. Banking exclusion should in that respect be seen both as a cause and a consequence of social 
exclusion. Promoting self-employment as a mean to overcome social exclusion is then a much wiser 
path to follow and a better guarantee of success for MFIs: micro-enterprises’ creation is both simple to 
measure and much easier to stimulate; (ii) As stated in Shekh [2006], the MFIs’ focus has often shifted 
 from borrowers’ wellbeing to the research of their financial sustainability. In terms of communication 
strategy, supporting small businesses creation and self-employment appears to be also much more 
compatible with this goal than poverty alleviation. (iii) Self-employment via the creation of micro-
entreprises could also be one of the solutions to fight against a persitant structural unemployment, 
especially in France. 
Although a commonly agreed definition of « what microfinance precisely is » exists at an 
international scale, it should be acknowledged that there is no unique model of microfinance. It also 
should be noted that this general definition isn’t suitable for an in-depth analysis of what microfinance 
institutions precisely are. Important differences do particularly exist between microfinance in 
developing countries and microfinance in industrialized countries. There are also substantial 
differences between microfinance sectors within industrialized countries. Two fundamental reasons 
explain these divergences. Firstly, the heterogeneity in countries’ banking environment maturity and 
secondly the differences between countries regarding the precise stakes involved in microfinance. The 
french microfinance regulatory framework illustrates this argument.  
French microfinance market is indeed, at first sight, characterized by the predominant position 
of a non profit-making association (Association pour le Droit à l’Initiative Economique, ADIE) which 
is a traditional microcredit institution based on the Grameen bank model4, delivering credit with 
positive interest rates and operating at a national scale. According to their national statistics, ADIE has 
contributed to the creation of more than 36 700 enterprises since 1989 and has delivered a total 
amount of loans of 127 millions dollars. Accordingly, more than 36 900 jobs have been financed. 
Among ADIE’s clients, 56% were social income earners whilst 35% of them were unemployed5. 
The overwhelming position of ADIE should nevertheless be qualified at the regional scale: 
two additional institutions of microfinance can indeed be identified in Aquitaine: (i) specific networks 
financed by public funds for on-lending to deliver exclusively interest-free loans made with no 
guarantee of repayments, namely France Initiative Réseau, and (ii) institutions of microfinance using 
group lending scheme and exclusively dedicated to women or young people willing to set up their own 
business (Clefe and Clej6). Although these institutions aren't representative of french microfinance 
sector, their role should not be underestimated. Their existence indeed clearly demonstrates that group 
lending schemes can be successfully implemented in industrialized countries. A third institution 
(Caisse sociale de développement local, Csdl) inspired by ADIE and operating only on a local urban 
                                                 
4
 French microfinance market is recent and has only started to surge at the beginning of the 90's. Adie, created in 
1989 by Maria Nowak, pionnered this sector.  
5
 Source: Adie annual activity report [2005].  
6
 Respectively Club local d’épargne pour les femmes qui entreprennent et Comité local d’épargne pour les 
jeunes. 
 basis must also be mentioned. Micro capital risk institutions, namely the cigales7, could similarly be 
considered as microfinance institutions operating in the Aquitaine aera8.  
French microfinance cannot be understood without references to the legal environment that 
surrounds lending activities for non-financial institutions. Up to July 2003, associations could only 
lend from their equity; they were not allowed to borrow for on lending. There is since a special 
window in the bank law for associations that lend to recipients of social income or unemployed 
persons9. ADIE is the only organisation that makes use of this special window.  
MFIs support underprivileged persons in two ways: on the one hand by a direct effect related 
to the grant of external resources and, on the other hand, by an indirect effect that is microcredit seen 
as a first step to access mainstream finance. Some MFIs objective is to cover a great part of the 
financing needs whilst some others only cover a small proportion of it. For these MFIs, microcredit is 
a way to constitute initial financial resources helping the creator to request the banking sector more 
easily. Despite the availability of internal statistics concerning the type of persons reached by these 
loans, it raises the obvious question about the reality of microcredit programmes and imposes an 
empirical analysis of French MFIs clients to determine microfinance sector’s effective outreach. 
 
IV. An econometric analysis of French MFIs’ clients  
 
We have collected data from microfinance institutions in Aquitaine between 2000 and 2006. 
A single, cross-section pool of borrowers has been built. The total number of 3866 credit files is 
included in this database, for a total amount of microcredit of 24 millions dollars. The variables 
available in that database are age, gender, nationality, marital status, main sources of income (social 
income10, unemployment benefit, minimum income, wage, manager income, other), level of education 
(from a level of 5 for primary school to a level of 1 for superior studies), loan structure (loan type, 
loan term, loan amount, level of the interest rate), business plan specific characteristics (total amount, 
professional sector, additional financing) and number of credit repayment problems (Annex 1).  
Our data firstly show that, contrary to developing countries where microfinance programmes 
are often dedicated to women, 65.4% of microcredit borrowers in Aquitaine are men (34.6% of 
women). These clients are in average 37 years old and 82.1% of them have French nationality. The 
social impact of microcredit is obvious: 48% of borrowers receive minimum or social income, 31% 
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 Club d’Investisseurs pour une Gestion Alternative et Locale de l’Epargne. 
8
 They shall however not be taken into account in the following econometric analysis since they do not grant 
microcredit.  
9
 The loan size should however not exceed of €6,000 and can be delivered only during the first five years after 
business creation. 
10
 More precisely, social integration minimum income (revenu minimum d’insertion).  
 are unemployed. Only 6.8% of total borrowers are wage-earner and 9.1% are company managers. 
Other borrowers are students or senior citizens (5%). Default rate is of 3.6%, but 18.2% of loans have 
repayment problems. The average amount of micro-loan is about 6200 dollars, for a total business plan 
amount of 37300 dollars11. Surprisingly, 41.3% of borrowers have their own financial resources.  
 
Table 1. Entrepreneurs characteristics (total and with microcredits), average. 
Gender Nationality  
 
Age 
(years) Male Female French Other 
Entrepreneurs 
with microcredit 
37 
 
65.4% 34.6% 82.1% 17.9% 
Entrepreneurs 
(total) 
39 70% 30% 89% 11% 
 
Social Status  
Active Unemployed Social 
Income 
Other (retired, 
student) 
 
Banking Loan 
Entrepreneurs 
with microcredit 
14% 
 
31% 48% 5% 27% 
Entrepreneurs 
(total) 
46% 21% 17% 16% 48% 
 
As seen in Table 1, microcredit finances whose personal characteristics (gender, nationality), 
social status, and own financial resources restrain their capability to have a full access to the banking 
system. Thus, only 27% of beneficiaries of microcredit have a bank loan, against 48% for all 
entrepreneurs. Microfinance institutions in France seem to reach the goal of promoting self-
employment of socially excluded populations.  
However, the reality is more complex. A Multiple Choice Analysis (MCA) allows us to 
establish the consistency of the set of qualitative variables and to identify some basic relationships 
between them. Notably, it identifies the existence of two types of borrowers with different 
characteristics. 
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 Representing respectively 4800 euros and 28700 euros at early 2006’s USD/EUR exchange rates. 
 Graph 1: Multiple factor Analysis 
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The first principal component, represented by the horizontal axis of Graph 1, opposes 
borrowers, excluded by the formal financial sector (variable Nobank), with households using 
microcredit to strengthen their bank relationships (variable Bank). This analysis also reveals that there 
is presumably a link between the fact of being excluded from the banking system and the fact of 
receiving minimum income or social security benefits (variable Social income). The descriptive, 
statistical analysis in Table 2 indeed confirms the existence of these two distinct groups of 
microfinance borrowers.  
 
 Table 2. Description of two types of microfinance borrowers 
Gender Nationality Marital status 
Group 
Number of 
individuals Male Female French Other Single Couple 
NoBank 
2717 
(70.3%) 
64% 36% 79.6% 20.4% 51.5% 48.5% 
Bank 
1149 
(29.7%) 
69.4% 30.6% 94.5% 5.5% 35% 65% 
 
Social Status 
Group Minimum 
Income 
Social 
incom
e 
Unemployed 
<1 year 
Unemploye
d >1 year 
Head 
Employe
e 
Other 
(retired, 
student) 
NoBank 43.1% 16.4% 15.7% 11% 5.8% 1.7% 6.2% 
Bank 2.4% 1.9% 39.3% 7% 22.6% 26.4% 0.4% 
 
People totally excluded from banking resources represent 70.3% of clients of microfinance 
institutions, but only 47% of cumulated credit. Their business plan is comparatively lower, with a net 
borrowing requirement of 12782 dollars (116459 dollars for the second, bank indebted, group), and a 
microcredit amount of 4204 dollars (11050 dollars for the second group). Consequently the 
microcredit maturity is shorter (19.5 months against 54.5 months). The interest rate is much higher: 6 
per cent against 0.6 percent. One of the reasons that could be advanced to explain this situation is that 
banking loans often complete interest free loans. It should be noted that the percentage of loss is 
doubled for bank indebted borrowers (6.2% of loss, against 3% for the second – non bank indebted – 
group). If we consider the reasons that explain the bank loan’s demand, it appears that microcredit and 
banking loan considered altogether finance for 49.5% new business, 43% repurchase of business and 
7.5% business expansion. Microcredit itself finances in priority new business (60.6%) whereas take-
over or expansion represent respectively only 22.4% and 16.9% of the draft contract. Finally, the level 
of education of bank and non bank indebted households are roughly similar, except for the less 
educated one (4.6% of bank indebted households have no diploma – 10.3% of non bank indebted 
households) and for postgraduates (15.8% of bank indebted households have university diploma, 5.8% 
for non bank indebted).  
In order to consolidate this initial graphical and statistical evidence, we used probit 
econometrics. The dependant variable Bank is a dummy variable which takes values of 0 and 1 only. 
This variable is equal to 0 if individuals are borrowers excluded from the banking sector and 1 if 
individuals use bank credit to complete microcredit.  
 
 Table 3. Probit regression : Bank equation 
Number of obs   =       3077 LR chi2(9) =    1652.85 Prob > chi2 =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -577.77808                        Pseudo R2       =     0.5885 
 
Change in Probability 
(marginal effects)* Bank Coefficient Std. Err z P>|z| 
dF/dx (*) x-bar 
Age 0.0202564 0.0046733 4.33 0.000 0.0006809 37.0627 
French 0.6260457 0.1393263 4.49 0.000 0.0142585 0.820279 
Studies -0.1108073 0.0347419 -3.19 0.001 -0.0037247 4.34433 
Minimum 
Income 
-1.478363 0.1486842 -9.94 0.000 -.0455048 0.366916 
Social 
Income 
-0.8765947 0.1902907 -4.61 0.000 -0.0164464 0.142996 
Unemployed 
(long time) 
-0.9406183 0.2202533 -4.27 0.000 -0.0153613 0.095873 
Manager 0.6757038 0.1172532 5.76 0.000 0 .0430105 0.082548 
Employee 1.051997 0.1270152 8.28 0.000 0.0969018 0.062073 
Private 
resources 
2.321674 0.1540665 15.07 0.000 0.2316681 0.356191 
Constant -3.197328 0.3024178 -10.57 0.000   
% correctly predicted = 90.97% 
 
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
z and P>|z| correspond to the test of the underlying coefficient being 0 
 
Probit does not allow for missing variables, which reduces the total number of observations to 
3077. Table 3 shows that social status is very important. The possibility of reaching banking additional 
financing resources is positively correlated with the status of wage earner or company manager. 
Conversely, social income or minimum income earners and unemployed people without 
unemployment benefits are those who are mostly excluded from the banking system. Level of 
education, French nationality, own resources increase the probability of being bank indebted and 
increase loan sizes. The level of the monthly borrower income does not appear to be significant. 
The dF/dX column reports the marginal effect, that is the change in the predicted probability 
of being bank indebted for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable or, for 
dummy variables, reports the discrete change in the probability (while holding all other independent 
variables constant at their means). The probability for a client of a microfinance institution to shift 
from one modality (excluded from the banking system) to the other (not excluded) increases of 4.3% if 
the borrower is a company manager, of 9.7% if he is an employee and of 23.2% if he has personal 
capital contribution. On the other side, the probability of not being bank excluded decreases when the 
borrower receives social income, or when he is a long-term unemployed (without benefits).  
Finally, more than half of the amount distributed by the IMF finances people socially 
integrated, with steady income or short-term unemployed. These micro-loans can complete high level 
business plans (up to 169000 dollars). 
 We have also studied the determinants of the amount of the microcredit using simple OLS 
estimators, with fixed effects in order to take account structural characteristics of the different French 
IMFs (Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Fixed-effects (within) regression: Micro-loan amount equation 
Number of obs      =      3127 
Group variable (i): IMFs                           Number of groups   =         5 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2473           between = 0.9041          overall = 0.5022    
F(8,3114)          =    127.89      Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
Loan size Coefficient Std. Err t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Age 12.6287    4.509918      2.80    0.005      3.78599     21.47142 
Women -539.5847    88.63594     -6.09    0.000     -713.3755    -365.7939 
Studies -120.3384    37.43995     -3.21    0.001     -193.7479    -46.92893 
Minimum 
Income 
-359.4068    94.86098     -3.79    0.000     -545.4032    -173.4104 
Manager 588.3961    167.4949      3.51    0.000 259.9845     916.8077 
Employee 986.4601    199.6558      4.94    0.000 594.9898     1377.93 
Bank loan 
size 
.0302862    .0022471     13.48    0.000 .0258803     .034692 
Private 
resources 
.0261047    .0042032      6.21    0.000 .0178633     .034346 
Constant 4160.592    240.0096     17.34    0.000 3689.999 4631.185 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(4, 3114) =   218.02             Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
In the same way, we found that the amount of the microcredit increases with the age of the 
borrower, with his level of formation, if the borrower is a male and if he has additional funding (own 
or banking funding). These characteristics are the same whatever the borrower is in the first group or 
in the second one. The determinants of microcredit supply finally are close to traditional bank credit 
supply. 
The social status is also an important determinant of the (micro) indebtedness capacity (see 
also Table 5). The dummy variable of Wage Earner or of Manager Income is positive and statistically 
significant, whereas the sign of social income dummy variable is negative. 
 
Table 5. Loan size, percentage of loss and social status (Average level, 2000-2006) 
 Employee Head Unemployed 
(short time) 
Unemployed 
(Long time) 
Social 
Income 
Minimum 
Income 
Other 
Micro-
loan size 
(dollars) 
11 830 9 800 7 370 4 587 4 250 3 678 3 966 
Business 
plan size 
(dollars) 
92 664 64 560 44 525 16 344 15 956 12 729 16 534 
% of loss 3.6% 11% 2.4% 2% 2.9% 2.1% 3.6% 
  
The stability of the monthly income is an important explanatory variable of the level of the 
microcredit, as in a traditional banking relationship. Finally, the determinants of IMF’s credit supply 
are relatively conventional. The amount of the microloan will be higher if the borrower is old, 
graduate or postgraduate,, if he is a man, an employee or an entrepreneur, or if he has additional funds 
(own resources or bank loans). The loan amount maintains some (social and gender) discrimination, 
which will have some important consequences. Indeed, the amount of the project is often positively 
correlated to its profitability and ultimately its sustainability. The poorest undertake small amounts 
projects that, for the most part, do not provide a sufficient income to live.  
Eventually, we have estimated the probability of repayment problem. We use a conditional 
fixed-effects logistic regression in an attempt to control for heterogeneity in the Microfinance 
institutions. A time trend captures changes over time in default rate.  
The probability of loss is positively correlated with the level of the business plan, but 
negatively correlated with the availability of banking resources or of own resources. The probability of 
loss is also negatively correlated with the level of the lending interest rate. As in developing countries, 
the probability of repayment is higher with women. Finally, the probability of loss increases if the loan 
aims to finance the expansion of an existing activity, and specially a bar, an hotel or a restaurant 
(variable Catering). This activity is 2.5 times riskier than other activities. If the borrower is a company 
manager (often linked to the loan purpose of expansion), the percentage of loss is multiplied by more 
than three. (Table 5). Financing a new activity or a take-over appears to be less risky. In any case, the 
monthly level of the household income appears to be significant.  
 
Table 6: Conditional fixed-effects logistic regression: Loss equation 
Number of obs  =  3078       LR chi2(10)  = 149.47     Prob > chi2 =   0.0000 
Log likelihood  = -272.46242                            Mc Fadden’s R2      =     0.215 
 
Loss Coefficient Std. Err z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Expansion 
loan 
1.135752    .3229236      3.52 0.000     .5028335     1.768671 
Repurchase 
loan 
-.6786393    .3255852     -2.08    0.037     -1.316774    -.040504 
Level of 
private 
ressources 
-.0000731     .000021     -3.48 0.000 -.0001141    -.000032 
Level of bank 
loan 
-.0000236    9.62e-06     -2.45    0.014     -.0000424 -4.72e-06 
Level of 
business plan 
.0000351    7.95e-06      4.41    0.000     .0000195 .0000507 
Women -.7117916    .2855755     -2.49    0.013     -1.271509    -.1520739 
Catering .9222166    .3153215      2.92    0.003     .3041978     1.540235 
Loan maturity -.0296066    .0128858     -2.30    0.022     -.0548623    -.0043509 
Interest rate -.2506635    .0464006     -5.40    0.000     -.341607    -.1597201 
 Trend -.6278252    .0961385     -6.53    0.000     -.8162533    -.4393972 
 
Surprisingly, the default rate is higher for bank indebtedness households (6.2% against 3% for 
non indebtedness households). However, multivariate analysis reveals that the availability of banking 
resources per se is not the proper cause of failure. In this case, indebtedness is larger, with average 
microcredit balance exceeding 11000 dollars, roughly three times larger than for borrowers of the first 
group, without bank loan. Thus, microcredit is an additional financing resources aiming to complete a 
relatively important business plan ($116,500 on average). The total amount of the business plan 
proved to be the principal trigger to disrupted loan.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Our results confirm that microfinance institutions reach two different populations. The first 
population (group 1) uses microcredit as additional financing resources to complete a relatively 
important business plan, where microcredit loan resources effectively only account for 17%. Such 
borrowers are rather more (short time) unemployed workers, businessmen or workers. The second 
population (group 2), totally excluded from the banking system, is more vulnerable. For this type of 
population, microcredit appears to be the only external financial resources available to start up a 
professional activity. Microfinance institutions dedicated to this population provide small loans (about 
$4,000) without collateral to households excluded from the labour market and deprived of resources 
from mainstream financial institutions. We emphasize the fact that the chances of finding oneself in 
the first group increase with age, French nationality and levels of education. Surprisingly, one of the 
key results of our paper is that the probability of default is much higher in the first group. It is 
positively correlated with the size of the business plan but is negatively correlated with the level of the 
lending interest rate. The availability of own capital is also an important factor of success. As in 
developing countries, the probability of repayment is higher with women. We also found that 
determinants of micro-credit supply by IMFs are fairly standard. The more the borrower is socially 
integrated, the higher the loan will be. This “discrimination” increases the likelihood of repayment of 
the loan, but also determines the type of funded activity, often less profitable, which may have a 
negative impact on the sustainability of the structure. 
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 Annex 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
Number of observations = 3866  Period = 2000-2006 
Dummy variables 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Bank indebted 
Yes=1  No=0 
 
0.297 
 
0.44 
Gender 
Woman=1  Man=0 
 
0.346 
 
0.476 
Nationality 
French=1  Other=0 
 
0.821 
 
0.383 
Marital Status 
Single=1 Couple=0 
 
0.488 
 
0.499 
Social Status 
Minimum Income=1  Otherwise=0 
Social Income=1  Otherwise=0 
Unemployed (<one year)=1  Otherwise=0 
Unemployed (>one year)  Otherwise=0 
Manager=1  Otherwise=0 
Employee=1  Otherwise=0 
Other 
 
0.346 
0.134 
0.207 
0.104 
0.091 
0.068 
0.05 
 
0.476 
0.340 
0.405 
0.305 
0.288 
0.252 
0.218 
Own resources 
Yes=1  No=0 
 
0.413 
 
0.492 
Experience 
Yes=1  No=0 
 
0.615 
 
0.499 
Purpose of the Loan 
New business=1  Otherwise=0 
Repurchase=1  Otherwise=0 
Expansion=1  Otherwise=0 
 
0.578 
0.276 
0.145 
 
0.494 
0.447 
0.352 
Activity 
Craft industry=1  Otherwise=0 
Services for firms=1  Otherwise=0 
Services for Households=1  Otherwise=0 
Retail trade=1  Otherwise=0 
Building industry=1  Otherwise=0 
Farming=1  Otherwise=0 
Catering=1  Otherwise=0 
 
0.057 
0.073 
0.308 
0.321 
0.114 
0.05 
0.077 
 
0.232 
0.26 
0.461 
0.467 
0.317 
0.218 
0.265 
Level of Studies 
University (Master-Doctorate)=1 
University (undergraduate)=2 
Secondary School=3 
Vocational trading=4 
Primary school=5 
 
3.34 
 
1.136 
Quantitative variables 
Variable Mean Range 
Age (years) 37 18-70 
MFIs Loan Size (euro) 4 801 100-38 000 
Bank Loan Size (euro) 12 689 0-785 000 
Total Financial Need (euro) 28 719 100-1 516 868 
Own resources Size (euro) 7 581 0-1 417 776 
Monthly Income (euro) 1 127 35-9 100 
 Loan Maturity (months) 26.4 1-92 
Interest Rate (%) 4.2 0-23 
 
 
